Today, November 21st, 2024, Ukraine reported that Russia had fired an ICBM missile toward Ukraine. Western countries claimed it was not an ICBM, but a medium-range rocket fired toward a military target in Ukraine.

Each day more reports of escalation and provocation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict emerge, and increasingly, mainstream media are using terms such as World War 3, and Nuclear Strike in their reporting.

NATO countries have provided, and authorized Ukraine to use NATO-provided medium range ATACM missiles against Russia, deep in their territory.

JJS Assessment of the situation: Putin has stated he will respond in kind to attacks against Russia. He has also stated that, in response to NATO countries providing military support for these missile strikes, he would not exclude the use of nuclear weapons and the targeting of NATO targets in their respective countries.

My assessment, Putin will show teeth and claws, but will not step into the deep state trap of escalating to WW3 before President Trump gets into office. An end to that war is possible soon if Putin doesn’t take the bait, and he knows this. And if he can/will use enough restraint, the results of a Trump-negotiated end to the war will be much more favorable to Russia than being lured into World War 3.

For this reason, we are maintaining AmCON 3 (Increased possibility of a comms-disrupting event)

However, it seems that the “deep state” controlling the NATO countries today would rather have WW3 than to have President Trump in office. This gives the appearance that some NATO countries are willing to keep escalating to the point that Russia feels it must respond using drastic measures.

If this conflict does escalate into all out war, we can expect communications of all types to be targeted, including satellite communications. The recent Ukrainian attacks against Russia could not be carried out without NATO personnel, intelligence, targeting, and missile guidance using satellites. For this reason, I would fully expect that satellites are part of Putin’s/Russia’s target package. I see satellite targeting as much more probable than directly striking targets on NATO nation soil. The political risk would be much lower for Russia. If this happens, then there is the question of whether Russia would target “that” satellite, or “them” satellites.

Other non-kinetic strategic targets are likely to be under-sea fiber optic telecommunications cables, such as what we saw earlier in the week with a Chinese ship allegedly cutting under-sea cables between Finland and Germany, the day after a cable was cut connecting Sweden to Lithuania. This is likely a glimpse of what is to come as this conflict escalates.

Get your comms up!

So, what if this does escalate? Then what?

The following is an action-item excerpt from the posting ‘What if conflict spreads and reaches the US?’, posted in November 2023, in response to the Israeli-Iranian conflict escalation.  These action items are still valid:

What if conflict spreads and reaches the US?

IF THE GRID IS UP:

  • We will use all grid-up (internet, etc.) tools we have to coordinate and stay informed.  We will announce on the website and other notification tools any changes to the AmCON (AmRRON Communications Readiness Condition) level.
  • Review the Signal Operating Instructions, and ensure that you have the latest white papers downloaded, printed, and with your SOI.
  • Stow any unused or unnecessary electronics in faraday protection, or at least disconnected from power and antennas
  • Make backups of thumb drives, files, and any other critical information and radio software files, etc.
  • Inspect and make final repairs on equipment if necessary, deploy any additional antennas prior to needing them.  Leave disconnected other than testing.
  • Participate in scheduled nets and exercises.
  • Test your local/neighborhood communications plan and remediate any deficiencies in your family/group/neighborhood communications
  • If the federal government declares amateur radio to be prohibited for use by civilians:
    • Understand the limitations.  It is possible that local VHF/UHF operations, including repeaters, may be exempt.  Some limitations may only apply to HF, or specific types of operations.
    • Stop transmitting if a band on which you operate is listed as prohibited
    • Maintain situational awareness by monitoring the HF bands and shortwave broadcasting
  • Take advantage of all services that are operational to top off batteries on everything, top off fuel, maintenance checks on equipment such as chainsaws, generators, etc. (This is something you should have already done, or are doing NOW).

IF THE GRID GOES DOWN:

  • Assume AmRRON is at AmCON Level 1
  • Listen more, transmit less.  When you first get on the air, monitor for a few minutes.  This helps avoid interfering with an ongoing QSO, and lets you gain situational awareness.  When the frequency is clear, feel free to send your call sign, or beacon, heartbeat, etc.
  • At the onset, prepare a STATREP.
    • COMMSTAT is the preferred method for submitting STATREPs.  Submit a COMMSTAT STATREP over the Persistent Presence Net soon after tuning to the appropriate frequency, or when you switch to another band, or when updating your STATREP if/when your status changes.
    • Prepare a STATREP in FLMSG, using the custom STATREP V5.0 form, and save it.  Update it and save as your status changes.
    • Submit STATREPs over Persistent Presence Net if you do not have COMMSTAT.
  • Assume AmRRON will be implementing Net Schedule BRAVO 
    • One national HF net per day (on voice and digital)  and;
    • One rolling regional HF net per day, in the evening (on voice and digital)
    • BE PREPARED to change frequencies and/or bands.  Net Control may determine that another band or frequency is more suitable for the net due to degraded band conditions or interference on the scheduled net frequency.  An ANCS, or other volunteer, should be left behind on the original frequency to direct stations to the new band/freq for several minutes, and each station copying the change should acknowledge for the benefit of others on frequency who may not copy the ANCS/volunteer.
  • If you do not hear the net (whether NCS, ANCS, or stations communicating with same), then the net may have moved due to interference which you cannot detect.  Search the band by slowly scrolling up (as much as 5kHz), and then down (as much as 5kHz).  Do this a couple of times.  If you still do not detect activity when the net is scheduled to take place, then switch bands (for example, the 80m band could be so degraded that the net had to move to 40m).
  • NCSs will prepare an IES (Initial Event Summary), and update it as information becomes available to them.
  • National and Eastern SIGCENs will prepare Initial Event Summaries and distribute them (on the Persistent Presence Net, as well as during scheduled nets after distribution to NCSs).
  • SITREPs.  If there is a significant development or an event for which a STATREP is not suitable, such as an event with a narrative, details, and descriptions, then submit a SITREP.
  • In a civil defense operating environment, nets will become ‘Operational’ Nets, and not training nets.  The emphasis will not be to take check ins.  The emphasis will be on keeping the frequency clear for traffic.  Follow instructions of the NCS/ANCS.  When NCS asks for traffic, respond with:
    • <YOURCALLSIGN> StateAbbr.  #of pieces of traffic, Precedence of traffic.
    • EXAMPLE:  DE W1XYZ VA 1 PP and 2 RR
  • NCS will handle traffic in order of precedence, highest to lowest.  Same precedence will be handled in order received.
  • Directed Traffic — If you have traffic intended for a specific party, expect NCS to coordinate getting you and the other station (or relay station) moved off of the net frequency to exchange your traffic.  Tier 5 and 6 stations will be monitoring nets to aid in getting traffic distributed to their destinations, and to the SIGCENs (Natl. and/or Eastern).
  • Traffic you may expect from AmRRON
    • Forwarded SITREPs (from NCSs, especially if related to a region)
    • IESs  (Initial Event Summaries).  These reports are prepared at the onset of an event by each NCS and each SIGCEN, as a way of sharing everything we know about an event at that time.
      • Follow-on reports after an IES is distributed, containing additional or updated information, should be in the form of a SITREP, AIB, or EXSUM.
    • AIBs (AmRRON Intelligence Briefs) providing short aggregate descriptions of news, intelligence, or other relevant information.  Generated at SIGCEN level.
    • EXSUMs (Executive Summaries).  A more comprehensive intelligence report summarizing developments, events, anticipated effects, and additional information or advisories for AmRRON operators.

The following postings have previously been published on the website, which could be of great benefit.

Russia and NATO: What if we go grid down at home

How To Receive AmRRON Net Traffic if Not an HF Transmit Station

Where to Find Local Frequencies for Monitoring — Staying Informed

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